RASP vs WAF: When to use which for API Security

Modern digital businesses rely heavily on APIs and web applications to deliver core services. This reliance has dramatically expanded the attack surface for cybersecurity teams. Industry surveys consistently show that APIs now underpin the majority of modern applications, with more than 90% of enterprises using APIs in production systems, according to Postman’s State of the API research. At the same time, analysts project that APIs will become one of the most frequently exploited attack vectors as enterprises continue to expose business logic through machine-to-machine interfaces.

The business impact of these risks is substantial. IBM’s most recent Cost of a Data Breach report estimates the average cost of a breach at over four million dollars, with incidents involving cloud and API driven systems taking longer to detect and remediate. For many enterprises, these incidents translate into regulatory exposure, customer churn, and delayed product delivery rather than just technical cleanup costs. As a result, application and API security has become a board-level concern rather than a purely operational one.

Yet many security programs still rely on controls that were designed for earlier generations of web applications. Web Application Firewalls and Runtime Application Self-Protection technologies were introduced to solve specific problems, but their effectiveness varies significantly in API first environments. This creates a practical challenge for security leaders deciding between rasp vs waf approaches. Understanding when waf rasp protections are effective, where they fall short, and how they apply to modern API security is now critical for reducing risk without slowing business velocity.

What is Runtime Application Self Protection (RASP)?

Runtime Application Self-Protection, or RASP, is an application security technology designed to detect and block certain classes of attacks from within a running application. Unlike perimeter controls that inspect traffic before it reaches the application, RASP operates inside the application runtime and observes how code executes in response to incoming requests.

RASP instruments the application or runtime environment to monitor execution paths, data flow, and interactions with sensitive functions such as database queries, file system access, and command execution. By tracking untrusted input as it moves through the application and reaches critical execution points, RASP can identify when a request attempts to trigger dangerous behavior.

This internal vantage point allows RASP to detect exploits that are difficult to identify from the network edge alone, particularly attacks targeting known execution sinks, such as SQL injection, command injection, unsafe deserialization, and server-side request forgery. When such behavior is detected, RASP can block the request, terminate execution, or raise an alert in real time.

At its core, RASP answers a narrow but essential question: “Is this request causing dangerous code to execute?” It is effective at mitigating exploitation of known vulnerability classes at runtime, but it relies on the application’s own logic and authorization decisions to determine what is permissible. As a result, RASP is well suited for exploit mitigation within applications, but it is not designed to understand higher-level API intent, object ownership, or business logic.

How does RASP Security work?

Runtime Application Self-Protection secures applications by monitoring how code executes while requests are being processed. Instead of analyzing traffic before it reaches the application, RASP evaluates what actually happens inside the application at runtime.

At a high level, RASP security works through the following steps:

• Request execution begins inside the application: Once a request has passed network and gateway controls, it is handled by the application. RASP operates at this stage, embedded within the runtime or application process.
• Untrusted input is tracked through execution paths: RASP marks and follows user supplied input as it flows through application logic. This allows it to understand how data propagates through methods, libraries, and frameworks.
• Sensitive execution points are continuously monitored: As the application executes, RASP observes interactions with high risk functions such as database queries, file access, command execution, and deserialization routines.
• Runtime decisions are enforced in real time: If execution reaches a known dangerous sink in an unsafe way, RASP can block the request, halt execution, or raise an alert immediately. This enables protection even when requests are authenticated and well formed.

This execution centric model makes RASP effective at stopping specific exploit techniques that bypass perimeter defenses. However, it also defines the boundary of what RASP can and cannot do. RASP evaluates whether code execution is dangerous, not whether an action should be allowed. This distinction is central to understanding rasp vs waf tradeoffs for API security, as both approaches focus on exploitation rather than authorization or intent.

Architecture

From an architectural perspective, RASP is deployed inside the application stack rather than in front of it. Its core components typically include:

• Runtime instrumentation: RASP instruments the application runtime or language environment to gain visibility into execution flow and function calls.
• Taint tracking engine: User supplied input is labeled and tracked as it propagates through the application, enabling RASP to identify when untrusted data reaches sensitive operations.
• Sink monitoring and execution hooks: RASP monitors critical sinks such as database interfaces, operating system calls, deserialization handlers, and network requests to detect unsafe execution patterns.
• Policy and response engine: When exploit behavior is detected, this component determines whether to block execution, terminate the request, or generate telemetry.

In WAF and RASP deployments, a WAF typically operates at the edge to filter obvious malicious traffic, while RASP provides last mile protection inside the application runtime. Both layers are valuable, but they answer different questions. A WAF checks whether a request appears malicious. RASP asks whether execution is dangerous.

The architectural limitation is that RASP only reacts to what the application executes. If the application logic permits access, returns excessive data, or enables privilege escalation without invoking a dangerous sink, RASP has no signal to intervene. This is why rasp-waf comparisons consistently show that neither approach was designed to secure APIs against logic driven abuse.

What RASP Is Good At (and Why That’s Still Not Enough)

Runtime Application Self-Protection is effective at mitigating a specific class of application security risks: exploits that trigger unsafe code execution at runtime. Its strength lies in visibility inside the application, where it can observe how requests interact with sensitive execution paths.

What RASP Is Good At

RASP performs well in scenarios where attacks manifest as dangerous runtime behavior. Because it operates inside the application, it can reliably detect and block exploitation attempts that are difficult to identify at the network layer.

Common vulnerability classes RASP can detect include:

• Injection attacks such as SQL injection, NoSQL injection, and LDAP injection, where untrusted input reaches query execution paths in unsafe ways
• Operating system command execution, including attempts to invoke shell commands through application logic
• Unsafe deserialization, where crafted payloads attempt to manipulate object creation or execution
• Server-side request forgery, when applications are coerced into making unintended internal network calls
• Expression language and eval abuse, where dynamic execution features are exploited

In these cases, RASP is effective because it observes execution at the moment risk materializes. It does not rely solely on payload signatures or traffic patterns. Instead, it blocks exploitation when known dangerous sinks are reached under unsafe conditions.

This makes RASP a valuable last line of defense, particularly in environments where vulnerabilities may exist but cannot be immediately remediated.

Why RASP Is Still Not Enough for API Security

Despite its strengths, RASP was not designed to secure APIs against their most common and damaging failure modes. Modern API breaches rarely depend on triggering unsafe execution paths. Instead, they exploit logic, authorization, and intended functionality.

RASP cannot determine:

• Whether a user owns the object they are accessing, which is central to detecting BOLA and IDOR vulnerabilities
• Whether a function should be accessible to a given role, limiting its ability to detect broken function level authorization.
• Whether a response exposes more data than intended, since excessive data exposure does not require unsafe execution
• Whether requests are part of abusive workflows, such as enumeration, scraping, or privilege probing

In these scenarios, every individual request may execute safely and correctly from a runtime perspective. The application code behaves exactly as written, so RASP has no signal to act on. Abuse emerges only when requests are evaluated in context across users, objects, and sequences.

This is where rasp vs waf comparisons often reach the same conclusion. While WAF and RASP operate at different layers, both focus on exploit detection rather than authorization intent or business logic correctness. Neither approach can answer the question that matters most for API security: should this request be allowed, given who the caller is and what they are trying to do?

RASP is an essential component of application security, but it addresses a narrow slice of the API risk landscape. Understanding this limitation is necessary before relying on rasp-waf deployments as a comprehensive API security strategy.

What is Web Application Firewall (WAF)?

A Web Application Firewall, or WAF, is a security control designed to monitor, filter, and block HTTP and HTTPS traffic before it reaches an application. WAFs operate at the application layer, typically at the network edge or in front of an application or API gateway, inspecting incoming requests for known malicious patterns.

WAFs analyze requests using a combination of rules, signatures, schemas, and behavioral heuristics. They evaluate elements such as request structure, headers, parameters, payloads, and request rates to determine whether traffic appears malicious or violates expected protocol behavior. When a request matches a known attack pattern or policy violation, the WAF can block, rate limit, or log the request.

This model makes WAFs effective at detecting and stopping common, well understood attack techniques such as injection payloads, cross site scripting, protocol violations, and exploitation attempts associated with known vulnerabilities. WAFs are also commonly used to mitigate basic automated abuse, including rate based attacks and simple scraping.

At a conceptual level, a WAF answers a narrow but essential question: “Does this request look malicious?” It evaluates traffic before application logic executes and lacks visibility into how requests are handled within the application or whether access should be permitted based on user identity, object ownership, or business logic.

As a result, WAFs are well suited for filtering obvious threats at the perimeter, but they are not designed to understand application intent or enforce authorization decisions. This distinction becomes critical when evaluating rasp vs waf approaches for API security, particularly in environments where attacks rely on valid requests and authenticated abuse rather than malformed payloads.

How does WAF Security work?

Web Application Firewall security works by inspecting application layer traffic before it reaches application logic. A WAF sits in front of an application or API endpoint and evaluates incoming requests to determine whether they match known malicious patterns or violate defined security policies.

At a high level, WAF security operates through the following steps:

• Requests are intercepted at the edge: Incoming HTTP or HTTPS requests are routed through the WAF before they reach the application. This typically occurs at the network edge, a reverse proxy, or an API gateway layer.
• Request structure and payloads are inspected: The WAF analyzes request headers, parameters, URLs, and bodies to identify suspicious content. This includes inspecting payloads for common injection patterns, malformed inputs, and protocol violations.
• Rules and signatures are evaluated: Requests are compared against predefined rulesets, attack signatures, and schemas. These rules may include known CVE patterns, expected parameter types, and rate thresholds.
• Enforcement decisions are applied: If a request violates a rule or appears malicious, the WAF can block, throttle, challenge, or log it for further analysis. Requests that pass inspection are forwarded to the application.

This request centric model makes WAFs effective at stopping obvious attacks early in the request lifecycle. However, because decisions are made before application logic executes, WAFs cannot assess whether a request should be allowed based on business context or authorization intent. This limitation is central to understanding rasp vs waf tradeoffs in API security.

Architecture

Architecturally, a WAF is deployed outside the application rather than within it. Its core components typically include:

• Traffic interception layer: The WAF functions as a reverse proxy or gateway component, ensuring all inbound traffic flows through it before reaching the application.
• Rule and signature engine: This component evaluates requests against known attack signatures, protocol rules, and security policies. These may include managed rulesets or custom rules defined by security teams.
• Schema and protocol validation: Many WAFs perform basic schema validation, checking that request parameters conform to expected formats and types. This helps catch malformed or unexpected inputs.
• Rate limiting and abuse controls: WAFs commonly include controls for basic rate based abuse, such as request flooding or simple scraping attempts.

In environments where both are deployed, WAFs typically filter obvious malicious traffic before requests reach the application, while RASP operates later within the runtime to mitigate certain exploit behaviors. While this layered approach improves coverage against known attack techniques, it does not address the core API risks tied to authorization, object ownership, and business logic.

The architectural constraint is inherent to the WAF model. Because it operates outside the application and before execution, a WAF cannot understand how requests are processed, who owns the data being accessed, or whether an authenticated action aligns with intended business rules. This is why rasp vs waf comparisons consistently conclude that WAFs are effective at stopping what looks malicious, but not at determining what is actually allowed.

RASP vs WAF

Both RASP and WAF play important roles in application security, but they operate at different layers and answer fundamentally different questions. The table below highlights how rasp vs waf differs in practice and why those differences matter for API security decisions.

Types of vulnerabilities detected by RASP vs WAF

RASP and WAF are both designed to stop exploitation, but they detect very different classes of vulnerabilities because they observe applications from fundamentally different vantage points. Understanding what each can and cannot detect is critical for evaluating their effectiveness in API driven environments.

Vulnerabilities Commonly Detected by WAF

WAFs are effective at identifying attacks that manifest as malicious or malformed requests before application logic executes. These vulnerabilities are typically visible at the protocol or payload level.

Examples include:

1. Injection payloads such as SQL injection and basic NoSQL injection when malicious syntax appears directly in request parameters

Example: A request containing a classic ' OR 1=1 pattern is blocked before reaching the application.

2. Cross site scripting attempts, particularly reflected XSS where script tags or known payloads appear in request input.

Example: A user input field containing <script> tags is rejected by the WAF.

3. Protocol violations and malformed requests

Example: Requests with invalid HTTP methods, unexpected headers, or malformed JSON bodies are blocked.

4. Known exploit signatures tied to CVEs

Example: A request matching a published vulnerability signature for a known framework exploit is blocked.

5. Basic automated abuse and rate based attacks

Example: A sudden spike in requests from a single IP triggering rate limiting rules.

In all these cases, the WAF succeeds because the attack looks suspicious at the request level. If the payload appears normal and conforms to expected schemas, the WAF has little signal to act on.

Vulnerabilities Commonly Detected by RASP

RASP detects vulnerabilities that become apparent only when code executes. Its strength lies in identifying unsafe runtime behavior rather than suspicious input patterns.

Examples include:

1. SQL, NoSQL, or LDAP injection when untrusted input reaches query execution paths unsafely

Example: A dynamically constructed database query executes with tainted input, triggering RASP blocking even if the payload looked benign.

2. Operating system command execution

Example: An API endpoint passes user input into a system call, causing RASP to interrupt execution.

3. Unsafe deserialization

Example: A crafted object payload causes unexpected object instantiation during runtime.

4. Server side request forgery

Example: The application attempts to make an internal network call to a sensitive service based on user input.

5. Expression language or eval abuse

Example: Runtime evaluation of user controlled expressions triggers execution safeguards.

In each case, the vulnerability is detected because dangerous code execution occurs, not because the request itself looked malicious.

What Neither RASP Nor WAF Can Detect Reliably

The most damaging API vulnerabilities do not fall cleanly into either category. They exploit logic and authorization rather than payloads or execution sinks.

Examples include:

1. Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA or IDOR)

Example: An authenticated user accesses another user’s account by changing an object ID in the request. The request is valid, authorized at the protocol level, and executes safely.

2. Broken function level authorization

Example: A standard user invokes an admin only API endpoint without triggering any unsafe execution.

3. Excessive data exposure

Example: An API returns sensitive fields that the caller should not see, without invoking any dangerous code.

4. Business logic and workflow abuse

Example: A sequence of valid API calls is used to escalate privileges or extract data over time.

5. Enumeration and scraping

Example: Iterative requests enumerate resources at a low rate that bypasses rate limits and does not trigger execution level protections.

These attacks fail securely at the protocol and execution level but succeed catastrophically at the logic level. This is why rasp vs waf comparisons consistently conclude that neither control can secure APIs comprehensively on its own.

Why WAF is not enough for API Security

Web Application Firewalls remain a foundational control for protecting applications and APIs at the perimeter. They are effective at filtering malicious looking traffic before it reaches application logic. However, API security failures rarely occur at the perimeter.

Modern APIs are most often abused through requests that are syntactically valid, properly authenticated, and compliant with protocol expectations. These requests pass through a WAF without triggering signatures or rules because there is nothing obviously malicious about them.

Consider a simple API that returns account information based on an object identifier. An authenticated user submits a request with a different account ID and successfully retrieves another customer’s data. From a WAF’s perspective, the request uses valid JSON, includes a legitimate token, and follows the expected schema. There is no injection payload, no protocol violation, and no rate anomaly. The request looks normal, so it is allowed.

This class of failure is common in APIs because authorization decisions are embedded in application logic rather than enforced at the edge. WAFs cannot determine object ownership, role intent, or whether a specific action aligns with business rules. Once authentication succeeds, the WAF has no context to assess whether the request should be permitted.

For security leaders, this creates a blind spot. WAF dashboards may show clean traffic and blocked attacks, while sensitive data is being exposed through legitimate looking API calls. The organization believes it is protected, but the most damaging risks remain invisible because they do not look like attacks at the network layer.

Why APIs Break the WAF + RASP Model

Even when WAF and RASP are deployed together, APIs expose a structural mismatch that neither control was designed to address.

Both WAF and RASP focus on exploit techniques. WAF evaluates whether requests look malicious before execution. RASP evaluates whether execution becomes dangerous at runtime. APIs, however, are most often breached through logic and authorization failures that involve neither malformed requests nor unsafe execution.

In a typical API breach, an attacker does not bypass authentication. Instead, they authenticate legitimately and then abuse the API's capabilities. This might involve accessing objects they do not own, invoking privileged functions, or chaining multiple valid calls into an abusive workflow. Each request is correct in isolation. The damage emerges only when intent and sequence are taken into account.

For example, a standard user may discover that an administrative endpoint is callable if they know the URL. The request executes cleanly, triggers no dangerous sinks, and returns data as coded. RASP sees correct execution. WAF sees a valid request. Yet the outcome represents a critical authorization failure.

This is why APIs often fail securely at the protocol and execution layers but fail catastrophically at the logic layer. Attacks look like normal usage. Payloads are valid. Tokens are legitimate. Neither WAF nor RASP has visibility into whether the action aligns with business intent.

For CISOs, this explains why API incidents continue to occur even in environments with mature perimeter and runtime defenses. The controls are functioning as designed, but they are answering the wrong questions for API security.

Benefits of WAF and RASP Protection

While WAF and RASP are not sufficient for comprehensive API security, they play an important role when used for the problems they are designed to solve. Their value becomes clear in specific, recurring scenarios that security teams face.

WAF: Reducing Noise and Blocking Commodity Attacks

WAFs are most effective at the perimeter, where they filter obvious malicious traffic before it consumes application resources.

For example, during an automated scanning campaign or a bot driven attack, a WAF can block malformed requests, known exploit payloads, and basic rate based abuse. This prevents large volumes of low sophistication traffic from ever reaching application logic, reducing alert fatigue and operational overhead.

From a leadership perspective, WAFs help stabilize environments by absorbing noise. They reduce the likelihood that common attacks escalate into incidents and allow application teams to focus on building and operating services rather than responding to constant background threats.

RASP: Mitigating Exploitation When Vulnerabilities Exist

RASP provides value when vulnerabilities are present but cannot be immediately fixed. Because it operates inside the application runtime, RASP can prevent certain classes of exploits even when insecure code paths exist.

For instance, if an application contains a vulnerable deserialization routine or an unsafe query construction pattern, RASP can interrupt execution when an exploit attempt occurs. This creates a temporary safety net that reduces exposure while remediation work is planned and executed.

For security leaders, RASP offers assurance that known high risk flaws are less likely to be actively exploited, especially in complex environments where patching may be delayed.

Layered Protection Against Exploit Driven Threats

Used together, WAF and RASP provide layered protection across different stages of request handling. WAFs filter suspicious traffic at the edge, while RASP mitigates certain exploit behaviors during execution.

This layered approach improves resilience against well known attack techniques and lowers the likelihood that a single control failure leads to immediate compromise. It is particularly useful for reducing the blast radius of known vulnerability classes.

Where Their Benefits End

Despite these strengths, WAF and RASP do not address the risks that dominate modern API breaches. They cannot determine whether a user is allowed to access a specific object, whether a sequence of requests constitutes abuse, or whether an API response exposes more data than intended.

In practice, this means organizations may have strong defenses against exploit driven attacks while remaining exposed to logic and authorization failures. Recognizing where WAF and RASP provide value, and where they do not, is essential for building an API security strategy that reflects real world threat models rather than assumptions.

Challenges of Using WAF and RASP for API Security

WAF and RASP are often deployed with the expectation that layering controls will naturally lead to comprehensive protection. In practice, API security challenges emerge precisely in the gaps between what these technologies were designed to observe and how APIs are actually abused.

Challenge: Valid Requests That Cause Invalid Outcomes

One of the most persistent challenges in API security is that attacks often look like normal usage.

Consider an API that allows authenticated users to retrieve account details. An attacker logs in legitimately and changes the object identifier in the request to access another customer’s data. The request is well formed, authenticated, and follows the expected schema.

A WAF sees nothing suspicious.

RASP observes correct code execution and no unsafe sinks.

Yet a serious breach has occurred. This highlights a fundamental issue. Both WAF and RASP evaluate how a request behaves, not whether the outcome should be allowed. RASP has deeper visibility than a WAF, but without understanding object ownership or authorization intent, it still cannot prevent this class of failure.

Challenge: Authenticated Abuse and Post-Login Attacks

APIs shift risk from pre-authentication attacks to post-authentication abuse. Once a valid token is presented, both WAF and RASP lose much of their signal.

For example, an attacker may slowly enumerate resources using valid credentials, staying under rate limits and accessing only allowed endpoints. Each request executes safely and independently. There is no malicious payload and no unsafe execution.

WAF rate controls may not trigger.

RASP sees each request as benign.

Abuse emerges only when behavior is evaluated across time, users, and objects. Neither WAF nor RASP is designed to reason across these dimensions.

Challenge: Business Logic and Workflow Exploitation

Many API breaches exploit workflows rather than individual requests.

A user may perform a sequence of valid actions that, when combined, allow privilege escalation or unauthorized state changes. Each step is permitted by the application logic. No single request triggers an exploit signature or unsafe execution.

RASP is more capable than a WAF in observing execution context, but it still operates at the request and sink level. It cannot determine whether a sequence of allowed actions violates business intent. If the code allows the workflow, RASP allows it.

This makes business logic abuse one of the most damaging and least detectable API risks for both controls.

Challenge: Excessive Data Exposure Without Exploitation

APIs frequently expose more data than intended, not because of exploits, but because of overly permissive responses.

An API may return internal identifiers, metadata, or sensitive fields by default. The response is generated correctly and securely from an execution standpoint.

WAF does not inspect response semantics.

RASP does not assess data sensitivity or least-privilege exposure.

As a result, sensitive data can leak continuously without triggering any protection.

Where RASP Improves on WAF, and Where It Still Falls Short

Compared to WAF, RASP offers improved visibility into runtime behavior and can mitigate certain exploit classes that bypass edge defenses. This makes RASP a stronger control for stopping exploitation when insecure code paths exist.

However, RASP’s deeper visibility does not equate to API awareness. It cannot infer intent, ownership, or correctness beyond what the application enforces. In API environments, the most damaging failures occur when logic is wrong, not when execution is unsafe.

The Core Limitation

WAF and RASP address different layers of the attack surface, but both share a common limitation. They are designed to stop how applications are attacked, not what APIs allow attackers to do.

Used together, they reduce exposure to exploit driven threats. Used in isolation, or even in combination, they cannot secure APIs end to end. Closing that gap requires controls that understand APIs as systems of identity, data, and business intent rather than just traffic and execution.

This leads naturally to the next section, where we examine how API native security approaches address the challenges that WAF and RASP cannot.

Achieve Complete API Security beyond WAF with RASP using Levo

WAF and RASP play essential supporting roles in application security, but neither was designed to secure APIs as systems of identity, data, and business logic. Most API breaches exploit authorization gaps, object ownership failures, and workflow abuse that look legitimate to both perimeter and runtime exploit defenses. Levo was explicitly built for this reality as an API-native security platform that addresses the classes of attacks WAF and RASP cannot defend against.

Levo approaches API security as a continuous lifecycle problem rather than a point solution. It combines proactive visibility and testing, policy driven governance, and runtime detection and blocking into a single platform that ensures API specific risks are detected, remediated, and prevented as APIs evolve. This architecture is intentionally designed to complement WAF and RASP while closing their most critical gaps.

Proactive: Visibility and API-Native Security Testing

Levo’s Proactive layer establishes the foundation that WAF and RASP lack: a complete, continuously updated understanding of the API surface. Through automated API Inventory, Levo discovers internal, external, partner, and shadow APIs directly from runtime traffic rather than relying on manual registration or static specifications. This inventory feeds living API Documentation that reflects how APIs actually behave in production, not how they were intended to behave.

Levo pairs this visibility with Sensitive Data Discovery, mapping how regulated and high-impact data flows across endpoints, methods, and users. This ensures testing and prioritization focus on the APIs that matter most to the business.

Built on this runtime context, Levo’s API Security Testing module executes exploit-aware tests that simulate real attacker behavior. It handles authentication automatically across OAuth, JWT, API keys, and mTLS, mutates parameters intelligently, and tests for API-specific failures such as BOLA, broken function level authorization, excessive data exposure, and business logic abuse. Unlike traditional tools, Levo proves exploitability by executing real attacks against real APIs, dramatically reducing noise and false positives.

Governance: Monitoring, Detection, and Risk Awareness

Security posture degrades quickly as APIs change. Levo’s Governance layer ensures that visibility and testing results translate into sustained control. Continuous API Monitoring tracks how APIs are actually used over time, highlighting schema drift, access pattern changes, and emerging risk as deployments evolve.

Levo’s API Detection capabilities correlate live traffic with application context to surface suspicious behavior that indicates abuse rather than obvious exploitation. Findings are captured through Vulnerabilities Reporting, which ties each issue to real requests, identities, and data paths, enabling faster remediation and clearer ownership.

Runtime Detection and Blocking

When prevention and governance are not enough, Levo’s runtime layer closes the loop. Through API Protection, Levo enforces precise, inline controls that block malicious behavior in real time without disrupting legitimate traffic. Unlike generic runtime defenses, these decisions are informed by API context, access paths, and business intent rather than signatures or unsafe sinks alone.

For advanced automation and operational scale, Levo’s MCP Server exposes security context programmatically. This enables teams and AI agents to query findings, validate fixes, rerun tests, and integrate API security directly into engineering and incident response workflows.

Conclusion

API security is fundamentally different from traditional application security. APIs are not breached through malformed requests or unsafe libraries alone, but through valid calls that exploit authorization gaps, business logic flaws, and unintended data access. These failures occur after authentication, across workflows, and within normal looking traffic, making them invisible to controls that focus only on code quality, payload inspection, or runtime exploit detection.

This is why tools such as SCA, WAF, and RASP, while necessary, are insufficient on their own for securing APIs. SCA helps manage dependency risk but cannot assess how APIs behave at runtime. WAFs are effective at filtering obvious malicious traffic but lack visibility into identity, ownership, and intent. RASP can mitigate certain exploit classes during execution, but it cannot reason about authorization correctness or business logic abuse. Each addresses a narrow slice of risk, leaving critical gaps when applied in isolation.

Levo was built to close those gaps by securing the full API attack surface across the entire software delivery lifecycle. Through continuous API discovery, documentation, and sensitive data mapping, Levo establishes accurate visibility into what APIs exist and how they are used. Its API-native security testing executes real, authenticated attacks to detect logic and authorization failures early. Governance and monitoring ensure posture does not degrade as APIs evolve, while runtime detection and blocking prevent active abuse in production. Together, these capabilities ensure API risks are detected, remediated, and blocked continuously rather than episodically.

Because Levo validates exploitability using real traffic, real identities, and real access paths, it surfaces fewer findings with far higher signal. This dramatically reduces false positives without introducing false negatives, allowing security and engineering teams to focus on genuine business risks rather than theoretical weaknesses.

Importantly, Levo is not positioned to replace SCA, WAF, or RASP. Those controls remain valuable for dependency hygiene and exploit mitigation. Levo complements them by providing the API-native layer they lack, one that understands authorization, data exposure, and business intent. Together, these controls form a complete and modern security architecture that allows organizations to scale API driven systems confidently without trading velocity for risk.